However, non-democratic societies, in which most civil wars occur, are often characterised by an over-pervasive security apparatus Baczko, Dorronsoro and Quesnay and intricate state-party relations Dorronsoro and Gourisse Moreover we add to the three types of capital cultural, economic, social established by Bourdieu the concept of identitarian capital Dorronsoro and Grojean Armed challenge to the state-monopoly brings about a radical and non-anticipated reconfiguration in three significant areas: the value of different types of capital, the formation of rival institutions, and rationality in everyday life deliberation, identities, life trajectories, routines.
These three themes correspond to three levels of analysis - macro, meso, and micro - that for the sake of clarity, I will now outline starting with the macro level. The changing value of capital In the context of a "general economy of practices", the State is the guarantor of the value of capitals and relations between sectors religious, judicial, political… Bourdieu and later, However, any withdrawal of the state does not, on the whole, provoke the disappearance of these different types of capital, simply the reassessment of their value.
The ability of social interactions to continue beyond the collapse of central institutions reveals the ability of certain social sectors to self-organize through local, informal or transnational regulation. For example, in the religious field restructuring can occur around transnational institutions. More generally, three phenomena can be observed where the State has lost control: the emergence of new capital, an often-abrupt change in the value of existing capital identity, cultural, economic and social and circuits of conversion of these capitals.
The genesis of institutions The end of a state monopoly creates the opportunity for the formation new institutions. This process permits us to observe the genesis, the workings and the transnational dimension of institutions in situ. Rationality and daily routines During civil war, the daily practices and perceptions of actors change in four areas: identity, routine, decision-making, and biographical trajectory. New Haven, Yale University, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler.
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Tull , "A Reconfiguration of Political Order? Congo ", African Affairs , The Transformation of Regulation", Afrika Focus 21 2 , Read more Read less Download document in pdf. The theoretical framework For the purposes of our research, civil war will be defined as a situation of withdrawal or disappearance of the State when challenged by one or more armed groups. The State's withdrawal marks the end of State monopolies - a "reverse sociogenesis" -, which leads to the re creation of new types of capital. As an example, the disappearance of national armed forces permits the appearance of a new military capital.
The formation of this specific capital occurs through the conversion of existing skills or capital, for example, economic or social Dorronsoro In addition, the formation of a new capital affects the relative value and the potential conversion of the remaining types of capital of social agents. Certain types of capital are particularly affected during civil war. This is particularly the case of social capital Baczko, Dorronsoro, Quesnay and identitarian capital Dorronsoro and Grojean In both cases, the withdrawal of the State indicates by contrast its role in what is commonly referred to as "spontaneous social life".
For example, identity ethnic or religious can be considered as a collective capital. Indeed, identity cannot be reduced to territorial or social belonging, a category of ethnographic description or popular perception; it also reveals varying access to resources.
The role of the state, as articulated by its public policies, is central to understanding this unequal access. This hierarchy is in part naturalised by the state Anderson , Bourdieu , even if the state is not able to retain control of the patterns of thinking in a world of circulating ideas and transnational mobilisation.
A sudden denaturalisation of inter-group hierarchies occurs when the state is challenged or disappears. Therefore, actors have to deal with psychological adjustments see C and may employ violence in order to restore, or to challenge, the hierarchy hitherto accepted.
The withdrawal or collapse of the state alters the way the various types of capitals are converted. Indeed, during peace, the State is usually both the operator and the guarantor of this conversion. Civil war reveals how capital is converted when State intervention disappears. On one hand, new conversion circuits appear. For example, politico-military actors have the resources to accumulate economic capital through taxation or alliances with various elites e.
On the other hand, State barriers of various kinds economic, legal that prohibit or make it costly to transfer capital from one field to another tend to disappear, and hence facilitate capital conversion.
For example, religious elites, previously excluded from politics, convert their religious legitimacy into a political one by becoming party leaders in Afghanistan Dorronsoro Three interlinked social processes permit the establishment of alternative institutions: the conversion of activist or party-based capital, objectivisation Berger and Luckmann and resource extraversion. First, social capital, activist or party-based capital is mobilised to form new institutions. Because activist networks are inter-linked, they occupy a central place in the formation new institutions.
In this context, institutions appear as objectivised social capital as we demonstrated in Syria Baczko, Dorronsoro, Quesnay The genesis of rational-legal organisations is often to be found in the mobilisation of networks that are informal and based on emotional ties. The objectivisation of these new institutions often follows, by mobilizing symbols and closure procedures.
The judicial field can rely on pre-existing and legitimate institutions, particularly within an Islamic framework, or other traditional practices. Finally, extraversion is the rule because of the scarcity of local resources and the frequent incapacity to self-organize.
As a result the dependence on external resources diaspora, foreign countries, transnational networks is essential to the development of new institutions, as we have shown in Syria and Afghanistan. This observation confers an even greater significance to the exceptions the PKK in Turkey, the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the FARC in Colombia , highlighting that bureaucratization is crucial to explain the ability of an armed group to mobilize resources. Two important observations emerge from the study of rebel institutions. First, multiple competing institutions State-related and those associated with armed movements transform the workings of traditional monopolistic institutions, notably in terms of security and justice.
Monopolies can be local, but in the absence of complete territorialisation, complex situations arise, notably cooperative relationships of accommodation formal or informal , and collaborations to manage certain indivisible goods, such as electricity in Aleppo Syria.
Second, the networks related to these institutions are consolidated in a process of mutual validation. For example, Taliban courts, enjoying functional autonomy succeeded in objectifying judiciary activities in the eyes of the population. This legitimized the administration and military organization which, in turn, empowered them in their newly gained functions Baczko Rebel institutions often bring organisational innovation. The extraversion of resources involved plays an important part in this innovation.
The dynamics of civil wars generally go across state borders and most armed movements have political leadership outside the territory. This helps to explain why organisational models of the armed movements are sometimes at odds with local history and pre-existing authorities. This transnational dimension has important consequences for governmentality, particularly when NGOs or IOs import their own models of population management. For example, the organization of camps often leads to changes in social hierarchy; whether it is the status of women or the legitimate modes of authority.
Moreover, the decentralized functioning of NGOs goes against the armed movements' attempts to impose a monopolistic authority and can lead to recurring tensions. How do civil wars change identities? In the absence of State guarantee, the hierarchy within and between different ethnic or religious groups are subjected to brutal changes. Individuals face complex situations, and deploy varied tactics to navigate the new status quo: notably the concealment of identity, and the choice of one affiliation over another.
These situations mobilise powerful affects and show that civil wars are situations that polarise and over-simplify the multiple identities of an individual or a group. Changing alignments of religious and ethnic identity and political affiliation forces individuals to reconsider and reconstruct their identity in a newly over-simplified manner. In this way, and as a result of the current conflicts, despite deep doctrinal differences and a troubled history, the Twelver Shias, Alawis and Alevis are often perceived and now tend to see themselves as belonging to the same group in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or Turkey.
Furthermore, the effects of violence also transform the relative power dynamics between age groups and between men and women. Contrary to the assumption of Elias, violence does not appear to be a step backwards, but more often the result of the socialisation into an institution political party, army , conforming to an ethos of virility or religious duty. The use of violence values certain skills and social positions, which makes it a resource that young men are more prone to use.
Women's activism in the PKK for example can work to slow, to a certain extent, the overwhelming domination of young men Grojean Routines are an important aspect of daily life. The majority do not constitute instrumentally rational behaviour Berger and Luckmann But in a civil war, individuals can no longer follow institutionalised routines, because the uncertainty of violence forces them to anticipate a new set of consequences, each time potentially dramatic, in every one of their actions Green Most daily activities sending children to school, participating on the black market, quarrelling with a neighbour have potentially serious consequences.
For example, how now to choose the authority to whom one should present a potential grievance? Do individuals decide differently in times of crisis? Civil wars reveal to what extent decision-making depends on a specific context Vigh The ideal-typical actor has three characteristics. First, she calculates the risks and likelihood of success.
Second, she arbitrates between different ends, individual or collective.
Finally, she deliberates, that is to say she makes her decisions after discussions in which he clarifies his preferences. The site of deliberations is strategically important because it is at the same time a place of information exchange, collective calculation of risks and benefits and project comparison.
Non-routine contexts transform the calculations, sociability and goals of individuals. The propensity to act is affected by unusual contexts in three ways: a hyper-assessment of every situation, group dynamics and the definition of a common project.